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8.1  Introduction 
Given the success with which tariff reductions have been negotiated during 
the postwar period, it is not surprising that the rules which govern the excep- 
tions from the negotiated tariff bindings have replaced the tariff bindings them- 
selves as the central focus of international cooperation in trade policy. In 1947, 
the principal task confronting the contracting parties of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was the reciprocal lowering of  high  statutory 
trade barriers in place at that time. Today, in contrast, the heart of international 
trade policy negotiation consists of such issues as the conditions under which 
countries  can  reimpose  temporary  “safeguard”  protection,  the  rules  under 
which one country can impose a countervailing duty on another’s subsidized 
exports, and procedures for settling disputes concerning the interpretation  of 
these and other trade rules as they arise. 
Nowhere is this change in emphasis more apparent than in the rising friction 
associated with antidumping law. Accusations that foreign firms are “dump- 
ing” products onto the domestic market and the belief that dumping is injurious 
to the domestic industry are by no means new.’ Almost 80 years ago, such 
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1. Dumping is defined as exporting products to the domestic market at export prices “below fair 
value,” i.e., either below the prices of comparable products for sale in the domestic market of the 
exporting country or below costs of production. 
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accusations and beliefs led the United  States to adopt its first antidumping 
legislation, as contained in sections 800-801  of the Revenue Act of  1916. But 
while the original intent of the law was to protect U.S. firms from the “unfair 
competition” implied by the alleged dumping practices of the highly cartelized 
and heavily protected German industries of the period (see Viner 1966, 242), 
antidumping law today seems to elicit a much broader usage.* 
With the use and abuse of antidumping law now regularly a central concern 
of both multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations, it is especially important 
to have as full an understanding as possible of the impact of existing antidump- 
ing laws on the free flow of trade, and of the uses to which antidumping law is 
put in practice. In this regard,  several researchers have challenged the view 
that antidumping law restricts trade only when antidumping duties are actually 
imposed, arguing that the threat or even the mere possibility of duties can also 
affect import flows. We  explore in this paper the differences  across import 
sources in the uses and effects of antidumping law, accounting for both direct 
as  well  as  possible  indirect  effects  on  imports  and  domestic  import- 
competing output. 
In an earlier paper  (Staiger and Wolak  1994a) we studied three possible 
channels through which these indirect effects might arise that when combined 
with the direct effects of duties capture most of the trade effects of antidump- 
ing law. We referred to these three nonduty effects as the “investigation effect,” 
the “suspension effect,” and the “withdrawal effect.” The first refers to the trade 
distortions associated with ongoing antidumping investigations, the second to 
the effects of “suspension agreements” (under which investigations are sus- 
pended in exchange for a promise by foreign firms to stop dumping), and the 
third to the effects of petitions that are withdrawn prior to a final determination. 
Our empirical findings, which  reflected  data on the timing and outcome of 
every antidumping investigation that covered a manufacturing industry product 
in the United States during the 1980-85  period, indicated that the investigation 
and suspension effects are substantial. Specifically, we found that suspension 
agreements lead to trade restrictions similar in magnitude to what would have 
been expected  if  antidumping duties were imposed instead. The effect of a 
typical  antidumping investigation  is to reduce imports during the period  of 
investigation by roughly half the reduction that could be expected if antidump- 
ing duties had been imposed from the beginning of the investigation. We found 
little evidence to support a significant withdrawal effect. 
Our focus on the broader trade effects of antidumping law also allowed us 
to consider the possibility that different firms might file antidumping petitions 
for different reasons. In particular,  we found evidence of two distinct filing 
strategies that appeared to coexist in the data, and we referred to firms as “out- 
2. This broadening usage was in part facilitated by explicit changes in U.S. antidumping law. 
For example, under the original U.S. law, predatory intent had to be shown to establish a finding 
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come filers” or “process filers” depending on which strategy they appeared to 
be using. Outcome filers are firms that file antidumping petitions in anticipa- 
tion of obtaining a finding of dumping and the relief that comes with it (either 
antidumping duties or a settlement agreement). Process filers are firms that file 
antidumping petitions, not to obtain a dumping finding, but rather to obtain the 
effects that  arise solely  from the  investigation  process itself.  Our estimates 
suggested that while outcome filers are by far the dominant users of antidump- 
ing law, process filing was the likely strategy used by between 3 and 4 percent 
of the industries in our sample. 
In the present paper we continue this line of research by looking for evi- 
dence of differences in the use and impacts of U.S. antidumping law as it is 
applied to imports from different trading partners. As we discuss in the next 
section, whether an antidumping petition is initiated for process or for outcome 
should depend not only on the characteristics of the domestic industry but also 
on the characteristics of the exporting country or  countries against which the 
petition is filed. In our earlier work we allowed for the possibility  that filing 
strategies might differ across U.S. industries, but we required firms in a given 
industry to pursue a common filing strategy against foreign imports, regardless 
of the country of origin. In this paper we allow the filing strategies of firms to 
be different for different import sources, but we impose the restriction that 
firms in all U.S. industries pursue the same overall filing strategy. Thus, we 
consider the possibility that U.S. firms may be outcome filers against imports 
from some countries and process filers against others. 
Using this method of analysis we are able to quantify significant differences 
in filing strategies used by US. industries against five sets of trading partner 
countries. We are also able to quantify the extent of import and domestic output 
distortions due to the various stages of the suit resolution  process for each of 
these five sets of trading partners. Finally, we are able to distinguish between 
regions exporting to the United  States that are primarily targets of process 
filings by U.S. industries, as well as those regions that are primarily targets of 
outcome filings by US. industries. 
We argue that the countries most likely to be the targets of process filings in 
the United States during our 1980-85  sample period are those whose export 
production over this period is predominantly destined for the U.S. market and 
accounts for a relatively large and stable U.S. market share. These characteris- 
tics point to Canada and Mexico as countries against which process filing by 
U.S. firms is likely to occur. Analyzing the filing behavior against imports from 
Canada and Mexico as well as against imports from four other regional group- 
ings, we find evidence in the filing behavior  and in the nature of the trade 
impacts which accompany filing to suggest that Canada and Mexico were in- 
deed the most likely targets of  antidumping petitions filed under the process 
filing strategy during our sample period. The regions against which the filing 
strategy of U.S. firms and the nature of  the associated trade impacts seems 
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the countries of  Western Europe and the region composed of Japan  and the 
newly industrialized countries (NICs) of East Asia. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly describes 
our motivation for including investigation, suspension, and withdrawal effects 
with the duty effects when quantifying the impact of antidumping law on im- 
ports and domestic output. It then describes the different investigation effects 
expected under outcome and process filing strategies. We also discuss in this 
section why some countries are more likely to be the target of process filing 
by U.S. firms than others. This discussion motivates the regional grouping of 
U.S. imports that we employ to carry out our empirical analysis. Section 8.3 
then describes our data and model for estimation and presents the results. Sec- 
tion 8.4 concludes with an interpretation of our findings. 
8.2  US.  Antidumping Law 
In this section we motivate why we believe it is important to consider the 
effects of  suspension agreements, withdrawn petitions, and the investigation 
process itself, in addition to the effects of duty imposition, when quantifying 
the impacts of antidumping law on imports and domestic output. We also de- 
scribe the different investigation effects on imports and domestic output that 
would be expected to arise under outcome and process filing. We then describe 
domestic filing behavior under these two filing strategies.’ Finally, we discuss 
why some countries are more likely to be the target of process filing by U.S. 
firms than others. 
We begin by making several observations concerning the practice of anti- 
dumping law in the United States which may be helpful to keep in mind. First, 
there are two findings necessary for a determination of dumping: (1) sales of 
imports at less than fair value (LTFV) and (2)  material injury to the domestic 
industry due to these imports. One government agency is assigned to each of 
these determinations-the  International Trade Commission (ITC) determines 
injury to the domestic industry and the Commerce Department’s International 
Trade Administration (ITA) makes the LTFV determination. A second point to 
bear in mind is that for each of these decisions there is a preliminary and final 
decision made by each agency. The statutory time allotted for the entire investi- 
gation ranges from 10 months to 14 months under special circumstances. Fi- 
nally, except in “critical circumstances” (a condition described more fully be- 
low but in practice rarely met), a final determination of dumping will bring 
the retroactive imposition of antidumping duties on all imports of the relevant 
products which entered the United States on or after the date of the preliminary 
LTFV finding, provided that the preliminary LTFV finding was affirmative (& 
it was for 93 percent of the products whose investigations made it to this stage 
of  the investigation process during the  1980-85  period). With these general 
3. A more detailed discussion of  these points is contained in Staiger and Wolak (1994a). 389  Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law  across Import Sources 
points in mind we  now  turn to a discussion of  the various potential trade- 
distorting effects of antidumping law. 
8.2.1 
A simple view of the trade effects of antidumping law would hold that trade 
flows are only affected by antidumping law when a petition is filed, dumping 
is found, and antidumping duties are imposed. Were this indeed the case, one 
could get a fairly complete understanding of the trade effects of antidumping 
law by examining those instances where antidumping duties were actually im- 
posed. However, there are a number of reasons to believe that this simple view 
is inadequate, that many of  the effects of  antidumping law  are indirect and 
subtle, and that a narrow focus on antidumping duties alone would overlook 
important nonduty channels through which antidumping law  could act. We 
now describe three nonduty effects which, we believe, when combined with 
the effects of duties, capture a major component of  the possible trade effects 
of antidumping law? 
Investigation Effect 
First, it is often claimed (see, e.g., Dale 1980, 85-86;  U.S. Congress, House 
1978, 12,278) that imports are restricted during the period over which an anti- 
dumping investigation is ongoing. As described more fully in Staiger and Wo- 
lak (1994a), there are two broad hypotheses concerning the reasons for and 
nature of this investigation effect. We refer to these two hypotheses as the “out- 
come filer” hypothesis and the “process filer” hypothesis. According to the 
outcome filer hypothesis, the investigation effect reflects actions taken by do- 
mestic importers andor foreign exporters in anticipation of  the duties that 
would be imposed in the event of  a final affirmative dumping determination 
and that would be assessed retroactively back to the date of  an  affirmative 
preliminary LTFV determination. That is, as noted above, an affirmative pre- 
liminary LTFV  determination carries with it the liability of  duty assessment 
for all imports entering thereafter if a final affirmative dumping determination 
is made  subsequently. Consequently, a preliminary finding of  LTFV  sales 
would be expected under this hypothesis to lead to a sharp drop in imports, 
with these trade-restricting effects lasting for the remainder of the investigation 
The Trade Effects of Antidumping Law 
4. There is a growing empirical literature concerned with the determinants and the duty and 
nonduty effects of  antidumping law.  See, eg,  Finger (1981), Hernander and Schwartz (1984). 
Salvatore (l987), Hartigan, Kamma, and Perry (1989), Messerlin (1989, 1990). Lichtenberg and 
Tan (1990). Harrison (1991), Prusa (1991). andstaiger and Wolak(1994a, 1994b). The two papers 
closest in spirit to our work here and in Staiger and Wolak (1994a) are Lichtenberg and Tan (1990) 
and Harrison (1991). However, unlike the present paper, neither Lichtenberg and Tan nor Harrison 
attempts to distinguish among the phases of  the investigation process, nor does either paper at- 
tempt to account exhaustively for the various postinvestigation outcomes. Also, neither paper at- 
tempts to explore the possibility that the use and effects of antidumping law are source-country 
specific. See Staiger and Wolak (1994a) for a more detailed comparison of  our work with these 
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period, as long as the petition was perceived as having a reasonable chance of 
ending in  a final dumping determination.  In fact, this kind  of  investigation 
effect figures prominently in many press accounts of ongoing antidumping ac- 
tions. For example, in reference to a U.S.  antidumping petition brought by the 
National Knitwear  and Sportswear Association against sweater producers in 
Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, the New York Times (1990) observes: 
“The [preliminary dumping] margins were announced as retailers are about to 
place orders for delivery next fall. Some industry officials said prospects of 
higher prices, or just the uncertainty over what the new price levels would be, 
could cause some retailers to switch to domestic suppliers.” 
In addition to a drop in  imports coming  with  an affirmative  preliminary 
LTFV determination, the outcome filer hypothesis carries with it two additional 
implications. First, in  light  of  the  possibility  of  an  affirmative  preliminary 
LTFV determination and subsequent falloff in import flows, imports might, if 
anything, be expected to rise somewhat during the first months of the investiga- 
tion in anticipation of this effect. In fact, evidently anticipating this possibility, 
U.S. law provides for an assessment of “critical circumstances” under which 
duties can be imposed retroactively to the date of filing if the filing of a petition 
brings with it a significant import surge. For this reason, we would expect any 
import increase associated with the early stages of  an investigation under the 
outcome filer hypothesis to be small. Second, under the outcome filer hypothe- 
sis, any petitions filed without regard to measures important for the final dump- 
ing determination  would  be  unlikely  to exhibit strong investigation  effects, 
since this hypothesis presumes a significant probability of a final dumping de- 
termination and consequent duty imposition. It is for this reason that we refer 
to this hypothesis as the outcome filer hypothesis: the strength of the investiga- 
tion effect under this hypothesis reflects the fear of retroactive duty imposition 
in the event of an affirmative final determination at the end of the investigation 
process and therefore ought to reflect the likelihood that the final outcome will 
be a finding of dumping. 
It is also possible that there are investigation  effects that do not reflect  a 
significant probability of retroactive duty imposition at the end of the investiga- 
tion process but reflect rather the effects of the investigation process itself. This 
embodies the process filer hypothesis. In an earlier paper (Staiger and Wolak 
1991), we presented a model in which domestic firms make strategic use of 
the ongoing antidumping investigation  of the pricing and sales practices of 
foreign firms to prevent the occurrence of price wars which might otherwise be 
triggered by periods of slack demand and low capacity utilization. Our theory 
suggests that domestic firms may value the competition-dampening effects of 
an ongoing antidumping investigation for its own sake and may file such peti- 
tions when capacity utilization is low with no expectation that they would actu- 
ally result in duties or other remedies. 
Specifically, we showed in Staiger and Wolak (1991) how  access to anti- 
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petitions by the domestic industry when capacity utilization is sufficiently low, 
and to less aggressive pricing by  foreign firms and greater market share for 
domestic firms-and  in fact to a fall in imports and a rise in domestic output- 
during the period of investigation as a result. This occurs despite the fact that 
antidumping duties are never actually imposed and were never expected to be 
imposed. That is, the entire investigation effect of antidumping law under this 
interpretation comes in the form of  a threat to “punish’ foreign firms with a 
duty if  they should “misbehave” and price too aggressively. Such a threat is 
made credible by filing the petition; because it is credible, the threatened duties 
need never materialize. In Staiger and Wolak (1994a), we referred to such filers 
as process filers and noted that (1) the act of filing ought to have an immediate 
trade-dampening effect which lasts for the duration of the investigation, distin- 
guishing the investigation  effects under process filers from those under out- 
come filers, and (2) process filers ought to file antidumping petitions on the 
basis of low capacity utilization and little else, and in particular should not be 
concerned with measures important for the final determination of  dumping, 
thus distinguishing the filing behavior of  process filers from that of outcome 
filers. 
Suspension  Effect 
Turning to the suspension effect, a second way  in which antidumping law 
may restrict trade through nonduty channels is through the effects of “suspen- 
sion agreements,” under which antidumping investigations  are suspended by 
the Commerce Department in exchange for an explicit agreement by foreign 
firms named in the antidumping petition to eliminate sales in the U.S. market at 
less than “fair value.” Since the intent of a suspension agreement is to provide a 
nonduty  alternative  by  which previous dumping  activities  can be halted, it 
would be surprising if there were not a suspension effect in the data. A promi- 
nent example involving such a suspension agreement (though not falling in our 
sample period) was the 1986 US.-Japan Semiconductor Trade Arrangement. 
Withdrawal Effect 
Finally, a third way  in which antidumping law may restrict trade through 
nonduty channels concerns the withdrawal effe~t.~  That is, the imposition of 
antidumping duties or the negotiation of a suspension agreement need not be 
the only outcomes of an antidumping petition for which postinvestigation re- 
lief from imports is secured. In this regard, Prusa (1992) has argued that peti- 
tions which are withdrawn by the domestic industry before a final determina- 
tion can have as restrictive an impact on subsequent trade flows as would be the 
case if a final determination of dumping had been made and duties imposed. 
5. In addition, a number of papers, e.g.,  Anderson (1992). Staiger and Wolak (1992), and Prusa 
(1988),  have suggested that the mere existence of antidumping law can have trade effects even in 
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Essentially, hsa  argues that domestic firms can use the threat of antidumping 
duties, together with the protection from domestic antitrust laws afforded when 
an antidumping proceeding is in progress, to bargain with foreign firms over 
domestic market share, and that the antidumping petition is withdrawn by the 
domestic industry if and when a sufficiently attractive bargain is struck.6 
8.2.2 
Focusing on the three nonduty  effects described above, together with the 
duty effect of  antidumping law, in Staiger and Wolak (1994a) we found evi- 
dence of substantial investigation  effects, and of  the trade restrictiveness of 
suspension agreements, but found no evidence that withdrawn  petitions had 
lasting trade-restricting effects. We also found some evidence for the coexis- 
tence of outcome and process filers in our data. However, we did not allow the 
filing strategy pursued by a domestic industry to differ by the identity of the 
country whose firms were named in the petition. Nor did we allow the trade 
effects of these petitions to vary systematically with the identity of the country 
against whose firms the petition was filed. In the next section we will present 
an extended framework which allows us to detect differences in filing strate- 
gies and in the impacts of antidumping law across the target countries named 
in the petition. However, before doing this we discuss why certain countries 
may be more likely targets of the process filing strategy than others. 
The logic of our process filing strategy is that domestic firms use the anti- 
dumping  investigation  process to reduce  the temptation  of foreign  firms to 
cut prices during periods of low capacity utilization. For this strategy to be 
sensible for domestic firms to pursue over our sample period, several condi- 
tions must be met in the country (countries) against which this filing strategy 
is being used. First, the firms exporting from each country named in the anti- 
dumping petition should account for a significant  share of  the relevant U.S. 
market, since otherwise the threat posed by these firms to the profitability of 
U.S. firms in the event of a breakdown in price discipline is likely to be small. 
Second, the U.S. market  share captured by  the  firms exporting from these 
countries should be relatively stable over the sample period, since otherwise 
the premise of an orderly pricing arrangement, whose breakdown during peri- 
ods of falling capacity utilization can be  avoided through the competition- 
dampening effects of antidumping investigations,  would be in doubt. Third, 
exporters from these countries should be relatively dependent on the U.S. mar- 
ket for their sales, since otherwise demand shifts in the U.S. market which lead 
to falling capacity utilization of U.S. firms might not lead to a significant fall 
The Targets of Process Filers 
6. Agreements between foreign firms and domestic petitioners are permitted under the Noerr- 
Pennington doctrine which provides exemption from prosecution under U.S. antitrust law. Direct 
conversations between domestic and foreign firms concerning prices or quantities would not be 
protected, so settlements are typically negotiated through the Commerce Department (Horlick 
1989).  See Prusa (1992)  for a detailed analysis of this exemption and its implications for the effects 
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in capacity utilization rates for the foreign exporters (and therefore would not 
give rise to a significant temptation on the part of foreign exporters to cut prices 
in the U.S. market). 
With these three criteria in mind, we note first that the five largest non-oil- 
exporting trading partners of the United States in 1980 by  import values were 
Canada (16 percent of total U.S. imports), Japan (13 percent of total U.S. im- 
ports), Mexico (5 percent of total U.S. imports), Germany (5 percent of  total 
U.S. imports), and the United Kingdom (4 percent of total U.S. imports), with 
a number of countries then clustered, each at just under 2 percent of total U.S. 
imports (International Monetary Fund  1987). Of  these five biggest import- 
source countries for the United States, the growth in U.S. imports from Japan 
over the 1980-85 period was three times the growth in total U.S. imports over 
this period, and nearly twice as fast as the growth in U.S. imports over this 
period from the country with the next fastest import growth (Germany). Of the 
remaining four countries with high and relatively stable shares of the U.S. mar- 
ket over this period, 65 percent of  Mexico’s  worldwide exports went to the 
U.S. market in 1980 and 61 percent of Canada’s exports did, while the United 
Kingdom and Germany exported 10 and 6 percent of their worldwide exports, 
respectively, to the U.S. market (Japan exported 24 percent of  its worldwide 
exports to the U.S. market). On this basis, we expect that Canada and Mexico 
would be the most likely targets of  process filings from U.S. firms over our 
sample period because they represent two countries whose export production 
over this period is predominantly destined for the U.S. market and accounts 
for a relatively large and stable US.  market share. 
8.3  The Uses and Impacts of Antidumping Law 
To investigate whether the filing strategies pursued by  domestic firms and 
the impacts of  the ensuing investigation process on the flow of  imports and 
domestic output vary  systematically with the identity of  the country whose 
firms are named in the petition, we must first describe our choice of regional 
groupings and the data sources used for all of the empirical work presented in 
this paper. We  then describe our econometric framework, which extends that 
of Staiger and Wolak (1994a). Finally, we estimate a model of industry-level 
antidumping suit filings and of the import and output effects associated with 
the various phases and potential outcomes of  the investigation process. We 
assess the degree to which our findings differ systematically as a function of 
the identity of the countries whose firms are targeted by the investigation. 
8.3.1  Regional Groupings 
To select the different exporting regions used in our analysis we attempted 
to balance several concerns. On  the one hand, we  had to keep the number 
of  regions from getting too large, lest the estimation of  the model become 
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should be grouped together. We settled on five regions:  Canada and Mexico, 
as the region representing the most likely target of  process filings, and four 
other regions. Our desire to group similar economies together led us to put all 
of  the planned  economies  of  Eastern  Europe  along with  the former  Soviet 
Union together as a single exporting region. We call this region the planned 
economy region, This desire also led us to group together all of the countries 
of Western Europe. In those cases in which we did not have a sufficient number 
of filings from a single country we grouped countries according to their loca- 
tion. This led us to group Japan in with  the NICs of  South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong. Our fifth region is a residual  of  all of  the other 
countries. Further disaggregation of this region into smaller regions along geo- 
graphic lines did not lead to statistically significantly different results for these 
subregions, so we retained this level of aggregation. 
8.3.2  Data Sources 
The source of  data for the industry-level economic magnitudes is the Na- 
tional Bureau of Economic Research Trude Data File (see Abowd 1990 for a 
detailed description of this data set). This data set contains annual data for the 
period  1958-85  on the value of domestic shipments, imports, and exports for 
450 U.S. manufacturing industries by four-digit 1972 Standard Industry Code 
(SIC). It also contains information on such industry-level economic aggregates 
as the  level of  employment and the size of  the capital  stock, as well as an 
industry-level output price deflator. The source for the filing dates for all anti- 
dumping petitions and the dates and outcomes of all the subsequent stages of 
the investigation process, as well as the identity of the countries whose firms 
are named in the investigation, is the National Technical Information Service’s 
Trude Action Monitoring System (TAMS)  Pending Investigation Report. This 
publication is produced by the Commerce Department on a monthly basis and 
tracks all petitions having to do with the 1974 Trade Act, such as petitions for 
escape clause relief, antidumping duties, countervailing duties, and remedies 
for unfair practices in import trade. Each month it lists the current disposition 
of each petition until its final determination. When an antidumping petition is 
filed, the petition must allege dumping of specific imported products. For pur- 
poses of the investigation, the ITC must then link the products under investiga- 
tion to product codes of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS). Con- 
sequently, the TAMS data set records for each petition the TSUS codes for the 
products  which  are allegedly being dumped, the country or countries from 
which these imports came, and the petition’s disposition in the current month. 
We explicitly account for filing at the TSUS product code level in our econo- 
metric  model of  the suit-filing  process and in our model of the impacts of 
antidumping suits on imports and domestic output flows. However, since our 
economic data is available at the four-digit  1972 SIC industry level, we must 
have a concordance between the TSUS codes and the four-digit  1972 SICS  to 
assign antidumping suits to SIC industries. We obtain a year-by-year concor- 395  Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law across Import Sources 
dance between TSUS product codes and the four-digit  1972 SIC codes from 
the Commerce Department’s Foreign Trade Division’s Imports Extract Muster 
Concordance. This concordance allows us to assign each TSUS product cov- 
ered by an antidumping petition to a four-digit SIC industry. Because TSUS 
codes are based on traded products and SIC code assignments are based on a 
firm’s principal productive  activities,  several SIC industries do not have any 
TSUS code associated with them over our sample. Consequently, a necessary 
requirement for an SIC industry to appear in our data set is that it contains at 
least one TSUS code product for each year during our sample. Only four indus- 
tries were deleted from the sample because they had no TSUS code in them 
for only a portion of the sample time period. Most of the industries omitted 
had no TSUS codes in them for all years. This concordance procedure left a 
total of 338 industries for our time period of 1980-85. 
Our empirical work focuses on 1980-85  because significant changes in the 
structure of U.S. antidumping law were made in the Trade Agreement Act of 
1979. Modifications of this act were made by the Trade and Tariff Act of  1984, 
but none of these are directly relevant to the issues we consider in our research. 
8.3.3  Econometric Model 
There are several aspects of the economic environment we are modeling that 
our econometric model should capture. These involve the joint determination 
of the decision to file a petition with the level of imports and domestic output 
in an industry, as well as a number of  specific characteristics of the petition- 
filing process and of the impacts of filings on the level of imports and domestic 
output. We begin with a brief  discussion of these modeling issues and then 
present the econometric model which we estimate. 
First, the decision to file an antidumping petition is likely to be determined 
jointly with the level of imports and domestic output in the industry. As such, 
filing, import, and output equations should be estimated jointly, allowing for 
the possibility of various correlations across equations. We allow for contem- 
poraneous correlation between the level of  imports and domestic output and 
the decision to file an antidumping suit against any of our five importing re- 
gions by the presence of an unobservable industry characteristic which affects 
the conditional mean of each of these variables. Our econometric model also 
allows for the existence of contemporaneous correlations among imports, do- 
mestic output, and the filing rates,  as well as correlations over time among 
these seven variables. 
Second, in attempting to understand the filing strategies used by firms, and 
to ask whether these strategies differ systematically with the identity of  the 
countries whose firms are targeted by the petitions, there are several character- 
istics which we need to capture in our econometric model. Of primary impor- 
tance is the fact, as mentioned above, that antidumping suits are filed at the 
TSUS code level although all of our economic data is at the four-digit SIC 
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information  about the TSUS-level  filing process using  SIC-level  economic 
data as regressors for the filing rate process. The number of filings in a given 
TSUS code is a nonnegative discrete-valued random variable that is zero for 
most time periods, but in the periods in which it is nonzero, it can take on 
large values. We  select a discrete distribution for the TSUS-level number of 
antidumping suit filings which allows for this “contagion” property. In addi- 
tion, to match the industry-level aggregation of our import and domestic output 
data, we need a distribution for TSUS-level filings which can be aggregated to 
the four-digit SIC level in a straightforward manner. 
Third, to measure the impacts of various stages of the antidumping investi- 
gation process on the flow of imports and domestic output, and to ask whether 
these impacts differ systematically with the identity of the countries involved, 
several characteristics of the investigation process must be accounted for. First, 
a single antidumping investigation can straddle more than a single year, while 
each of the various stages of the process last only a fraction of a year. In addi- 
tion, at the level of multilateral imports several antidumping investigations or 
outcomes can be simultaneously active in a single TSUS code because of fil- 
ings against the same product imported from different countries. These charac- 
teristics present a problem because, as mentioned above, our data on imports 
and domestic output are only available on an annual basis at the four-digit SIC 
level and our import data is not broken down by source country. Consequently, 
we must specify a model which will allow us to recover the TSUS-level  im- 
pacts on the flows of imports and on domestic output from stages of the investi- 
gation process which may run over adjacent years or for a fraction of a year, 
accounting for the possibility  of  multiple filings from the same TSUS code, 
using  data  which  is  time  aggregated  to  annual  magnitudes  and  cross- 
sectionally aggregated to the four-digit SIC industry level, and with import 
data which is only available at a multilateral  level. Our TSUS-level, within- 
year flow model provides a framework for us to recover within-year country- 
specific effects from annual multilateral import and domestic output levels us- 
ing indexes of country-specific suit activity in that year. 
Our SIC-level model of  the filing rate process and the impacts of the investi- 
gation process can be interpreted without reference to the underlying TSUS- 
level processes. However, our bottom-up approach, starting with a TSUS-level 
model which has not been time aggregated to the annual magnitudes nor aggre- 
gated  across  country  to  multilateral  magnitudes,  specifies  an  econometric 
model at the level of time, country, and product aggregation at which the true 
underlying processes are occurring. It is then aggregated across time, product, 
and country to an industry-level model. This modeling strategy allows the re- 
covery of  both TSUS- and industry-level impacts because the industry-level 
model is obtained from the explicit aggregation  of the TSUS-level model. In 
addition, the strategy makes explicit the restrictions imposed on the TSUS- 
level and region-level  models which are implied by  estimating an industry- 
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We now describe the details of our econometric model of suit-filing behavior 
and its impacts on the level of imports and domestic output. Let f,,,,  be the 
number of antidumping suits filed in industry i against good g  from region r 
in period t, whereg = 1,. . . ,  G,,, t = 1,. . . ,  T, r = 1,. . . ,  R, andi = 1,. . . ,  N. 
In the present case R = 5, T = 6,  and N = 338. Because antidumping suits are 
filed at the TSUS code level, for the purposes of this paper a good is defined 
to be a TSUS product code. 
Let Agn, denote the rate at which suits are filed in industry i against good g 
from region r in period t. We assume that the distribution off,,, given Agn, is 
Poisson (P(A)) with parameter A = Agn,. We denote this fact using the notation 
(1) 
These assumptions are consistent with f,,, being a Poisson point process for 
the time interval t to t + 1, which we will call time period t. 
We further assume that Agn, possesses a gamma distribution r(  p,,,,  ad,  where 
pr,,  = exp(X,:yr  + Sr8,).  The vector X,, contains the observable characteristics 
of industry i as of the beginning of time t which affect its filing rate; the vector 
y,  and the scalars u,  and Sr are parameters to be e~timated.~  The variable 8, is 
the unobservable characteristic of industry i which affects the mean filing rate 
for that industry, and Sr is the parameter which denotes the impact 8, has on the 
filing rate against region I:  We assume that 8, is independently and identically 
distributed across industries and remains constant over time. Using our above 
notation we have 
&,,,  I hpr,,  -  P(hgrJ 
(2) 
Assumption (2) implies that each product class from region r within industry i 
and in time period t has a different mean rate of filing (Agn,),  although all of 
these filing rates are drawn from the same gamma distribution. 
Xgn, I  w,,, 8,) -  r(exP(x,:yr  + S9,h  ur). 
Combining assumptions (1) and (2), we have 
(3) 
where Ohgn,  denotes compounding or mixing the parameter Agr,,  of the Poisson 
distribution with a gamma distribution r(exp(X,;yr + S,8,), ur).  Results from 
Johnson and Kotz (1969, chap. 5) imply that f,,,,  has a negative binomial distri- 
bution with parameters ur  and p.,,,  = exp(X,:y,  + Zir8,). We abbreviate this as 
f,,, -  NB(u,,  p,,,). This discrete density takes the following form: 
(4) 
The mean off,,.,  is urprj,.  We assume that conditional on 8;, fgrj,  is independent 
of f,qj.T  so long as any one of the four subscript indexes differ. 
7. In  Staiger and Wolak (1994a). we constrained all r-subscripted variables to be equal across 
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Our data generation process captures the following logic. In each period t, 
Xgr,,, the filing rate against product class g imported from region r in industry 
i,  is drawn from a r(exp(X”,yr + tire,),  u,)  distribution. Conditional on this 
draw of Agn, and the value of 8,,  the actual filing behavior against an individual 
product class from region r evolves according to a Poisson process with rate 
AXr,,. For each regional import source, this compound distribution model allows 
for differences in filing rates across product classes within an industry. At the 
same time, for each regional import source, the model imposes the restriction 
that the filing rates against imports for all product classes within an industry 
have the same expectation. From our estimation procedure we can recover esti- 
mates of  the parameters of both the distribution r(exp(X,’,yr + Sr8,),  u,) and 
the filing Poisson process conditional on the realized value of A,,,,  . 
The filing of  an antidumping suit is a rare event, but when it occurs there 
tends to be clustering in the number of filings. Within the context of our econo- 
metric model we can think of this clustering of suits as caused by the positive 
skewness in the gamma distribution for AX,,,,  so that most realizations of  the 
rate of the Poisson process are very small. However, a large realization occurs 
very rarely, which in turn implies a large number of observed filings. In addi- 
tion, the unobserved heterogeneity  across industries represented by  8, allows 
for a much larger (or smaller) level of filing activity from a given industry than 
is predicted by its observable characteristics. Both the stochastic nature of the 
mean filing rate and the impact of unobservable industry-level heterogeneity 8, 
on the filing rate allow for a substantial amount of variability  in the TSUS- 
level filing rates across industries. 
To computef,,,, the total number of suits filed within industry i against region 
r during period t, we sumfgrr,  from g = 1 to G,,, the total number of TSUS 
product codes within industry i in period t. This summation yields 
G., 
This industry-level annual amount of filing activity against region r is the ob- 
servable dependent variable used to estimate the parameters y, and u, and the 
across-industry distribution of heterogeneity f(8). 
To construct the conditional density off,,, given O,, we utilize the fact that 
the sum of two independent NB(a, p) random variables is NB(2a, p). This 
implies thatf,,, possesses a negative binomial distribution with parameters G,,u, 
and kr,,  = exp(X,’,yr + 8,8,),  conditional on the value of 8,. Consequently, the 
conditional distribution off,,, given 8, is 
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ee 
r(a)  =  re -  I  e-‘ dr.  I 
We  have also made use of the relationship T(ol + 1) = a!.  The joint density 
function ofi  = cf,,,f,,, .  . .  ,fR,>, wherefr, = Cf980.r3fi981,,~  . . . rfi985,,)f,  is 
(7) 
where prV;,, I e,] is defined in equation (6). Henceforth let t = 1, . . . ,  T = 6 
denote the years 1980-85.  The structure of  equation (7) accounts for several 
aspects of our underlying data generation process. First, it allows for contem- 
poraneous correlation across regions in the filing rates for a given industry. 
Second, it allows for correlation over time in filing rates both for a given region 
and across regions. Finally, it accounts for the discrete, nonnegative support 
and extreme positive skewness in the density of filings for each region. 
We now turn to our model of the impact of antidumping investigation activ- 
ity and outcomes on industry-level imports and output which is linked to the 
model of  filing activity through the unobserved industry heterogeneity 8,. As 
discussed above, because we are attempting to measure the within-year effects 
of the stages and various outcomes of the antidumping investigation process 
from annual magnitudes, we first specify a model for the rate of  imports of 
product class g in industry i from region j within any given year t which incor- 
porates how each of the stages and outcomes of the investigation process af- 
fects this rate. We  then aggregate this regional import rate equation over re- 
gions to obtain the (multilateral) import rate equation. Specifying an analogous 
equation for the rate of domestic output, we then aggregate these two within- 
year flow equations to obtain the annual level of imports and domestic output 
by  product class. This aggregation process produces indexes of  annual suit 
activity consistent with our model of import and domestic output flows. Aggre- 
gating these TSUS-level annual-level equations over all products in each four- 
digit SIC industry yields industry-level  equations which can be estimated using 
our industry-level data. 
Specifically, let IMPa,, denote the level of imports from regionj for product 
class g in industry i in time period  t. Let OUT,,,  denote the level of  output 
produced domestically in product class g in industry i in time period t. 
Our within-year model of  the impacts of suit activity assumes that for any 
year t and industry i,  the following linear differential equations characterize 
the instantaneous annual rate of change in the quantity of imports from region 
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(9) 
where p;  and Po are coefficients quantifying the impact of  the unobservable 
industry heterogeneity on the rate of change of imports from region j and in- 
dustry i and of output in industry i for all time, (;  and (:  are fixed time effects 
for the two rates of change for year t, and C,  denotes a summation over the 
range of the index z.  The count variables Z;&)  (k = OGP, OGPLFV, OGSUS, 
OGWD, and OGD) count, respectively, the number of currently ongoing anti- 
dumping petitions (OGP), ongoing affirmative preliminary LTFV determina- 
tions (OGPLFV), ongoing suspension agreements (OGSUS), ongoing with- 
drawn petitions (OGWD), and ongoing antidumping duties (OGD) for all s E 
[t, t + 1) against product class g from region r in industry i and time period t. 
Hence, equation (8r)  allows for the possibility that suit activity k against region 
r can affect import flows from regionj (as measured by  P;k).  The variables 
eJm)  and ex,,(o)  are independent identically distributed shocks to the rate of 
imports from region r and output for product class g in industry i during pe- 
riod t. 
We  now  aggregate the regional import rate equation (8r) over the R  = 5 
regions to obtain the (multilateral) import rate equation (8) analogous to the 
output rate equation (9): 
where IMPg,r  = C, IMPgllr,  P" = C,  P;",  .5:  = C,  C;,  P;  = C,  P;k,  and e,,,(m) = 
C,  e,,,(m). The coefficients P:k, (1 = 0, m) quantify the impact of  a one-unit 
change in region r's count variables Z;,,(s)  on the annual rate of (multilateral) 
imports and domestic output for good g in industry i during time period t. We 
assume that the disturbance vector e,,, = (eJm), eg,,(o))'  possesses a bivariate 
normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix c.  We  assume that 
ex,,  is independent and identically distributed across goods and industries and 
over time. 
To clarify how the workings of antidumping law affect the quantity of im- 
ports and domestic output in our model, consider the following example. Sup- 
pose that no antidumping investigation or action is currently in effect on im- 
ports from product class g in industry i during year t. In this case the rate of 
imports in product class g in industry i is 
Suppose now that an antidumping investigation is initiated some time during 
period ton imports in this product class from region I: The variable Z$r(s)  will 
then take on the value 1 for all s  E [t,  t + 1) such that the antidumping investi- 
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the value of PyOGP  because an investigation is currently ongoing against goods 
of  that product class from region  1.  Should another petition be filed against 
imports within this product class from somewhere else in region T during the 
same time interval, then ZF(s)  will take on the value 2 for as long as both sets 
of  investigations are ongoing; it will return to the value of  1 when a single 
investigation is again active, and 0 when no investigations are active. Each of 
the other count variables behaves in a similar manner. 
Continuing with the derivation of our TSUS-level import and output equa- 






In  order to compute industry-level import and output equations from these 
product-level equations, we must aggregate over all of  the product classes g 
within industry i in period t. Summing over all g  yields 
where 
Gir  G,' 
IMP,, = c  IMP,,,,  OUT,, = c  OUT,, , 
g=  I  g=l 
Gi,  Gir 
g= I  g=l 
for 1 = m,  o. This aggregation procedure implies that q,, = (qt,(m),  qt,(o))' is 
N(0, G,,C.) so that q,,  is heteroskedastic conditional on G,,. Dividing equations 
(13) and (14) by G,, yields a model more amenable to estimation. This form of 
the model is analogous to the conventional fixed time effects, random individ- 
ual effects panel-data model. The model is 
(15)  IMPJG,,  = P:+  q,,(mW,,,  OUTJG,,  = I*:  + q,,(oW,,, 
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The variables p;  and pp, are the conditional means of the normalized annual 
imports and output from industry i in period t. Each of the normalized count 
variables now can be interpreted as a measure of the intensity of suit activity. 
The normalized error vector q,,/G,,  is still heteroskedastic because of the distri- 
bution for q,,  given above. Consequently, we apply the appropriate weighting 
scheme in the construction of the likelihood function. 
Using our distributional assumptions we can construct the joint density of 
IMP,* =  (IMPrl/G,l, . . . , IMPJGJ’  and  OUTl* =  (OUT,,/G,,,  . . . , 
OUT,,/G,,)’  conditional on 8, as follows. Conditional on the value of  O,,  the 
joint density of the two-dimensional vector (IMPJG,, ,  OUTJG,,)’  is 
(17) 
where Y,,  = ((IMPJG,, -  p;),  (OUTJG,, -  pp,))’.  This implies that the joint 
density of (IMP,*, OUT:)’  conditional on 8, is 
r 
 IMP,*, OUT,* I el)  = n +(IMP,,E!,,  OUTJG,,  I or). 
,=I  (18) 
Combining this joint density with the joint density of regional filings over the 
sample period yields the following joint density of filings against the five re- 
gions, output, and imports over our sample period conditional on 8,: 
(19)  g(f;, IMP:,  OUT,*I  0,) = MIMP:,  OUT:  I  0,) prcf; I  0,). 
To complete the construction of the unconditional joint density of  filings, 
output, and imports over our sample period for any industry we must integrate 
this conditional density with respect to the density of 8. We choose a discrete 
factor approximation to this unknown density. Recent Monte Car10 work by 
Mroz and Guilkey (1991) has found these discrete factor structures are able to 
model a wide variety of potential unobserved heterogeneity distributions. For 
many models involving discrete and continuous endogenous variables, the pa- 
rameters of the conditional distribution of interest estimated from these models 
were found to dominate those obtained from the maximum likelihood estima- 
tor in terms of mean squared error loss for sample sizes considered. Integrating 
with respect to this discrete density of 8, (T,,  0,) for h = 1, . . . ,  H, where H 
is the number of points of support of the discrete density and nTTh  the probability 
associated with the point of support 8,,  yields 
In our empirical work, we found that choosing H  = 3 was sufficient to ade- 
quately estimatef(8). We found that for larger values of H  the parameters of 
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domestic output equations did not change appreciably.x Taking the logarithm 
of p(i,  IMPt*,  OUT,*)  and summing from i = 1 to N yields the log-likelihood 
function for our model. 
Before presenting  the estimates of the parameters of the joint density of 
these seven variables we must first discuss the variables entering X,,  the vector 
of observable industry characteristics shifting the conditional mean of the fil- 
ing rate of industry i  and time period  t. Because  we wish  to allow for the 
possibility that firms pursue the outcome filing strategy against some regions 
and the process filing strategy against others, we include in X,, variables sug- 
gested by both filing strategies. Note that the absence of an r subscript on the 
vector X,,  reflects the restriction that regional filing rates do not depend on the 
characteristics of the regions. Our lack of data at the regional level necessitated 
this restriction. 
Our main objective in selecting outcome filer variables for inclusion in X,, 
follows from the logic that if a variable is used to determine injury in an anti- 
dumping suit proceeding and industries are aware of this, then these variables 
should be predictors of future dumping suit activity (under the outcome filing 
strategy). Although the domestic industry must concern itself with the estab- 
lishment of injury, a LTFV determination is also necessary for dumping to be 
found. Moreover, the margin by  which the Commerce Department finds that 
final sales to the domestic market are made at less than fair value determines 
the magnitude of the antidumping duties that the petitioning industry can ex- 
pect.  Nevertheless,  the  Commerce  Department’s  final  LTFV margin  is ex- 
tremely unpredictable, and there are biases inherent in the process used to de- 
termine its level which favor finding a positive margin.9 For these reasons, we 
hypothesize that firms pursuing the outcome filing strategy file primarily based 
on the observable industry characteristics that determine injury and allow for a 
sufficiently rich stochastic structure for our model to account for unobservable 
differences in filing behavior across industries. 
A major indicator of injury to the petitioning firms is the import penetration 
ratio IMPEN!, = IMPJIMP,,  + OUT,,). A large value of TMPEN is indicative 
of a large foreign presence in the domestic market, which may be injurious to 
the domestic firms. A second variable  which is used  to assess injury is the 
domestic firm’s capacity utilization rate,  which we represent at the industry 
level by CAPU,, = OUTJCAP,,  (where OUT!, is real shipments and CAP,, is 
real capital stock). We  compute OUT,, as the nominal  value of  annual ship- 
8. This result is consistent with the Monte Carlo evidence in Mroz and Guilkey (1991). who 
found small values of H were sufficient to adequately capture variability due to 8. 
9. This uncertainty is due in  part to the different methodologies, sometimes for a single suit, 
that can be used to determine this margin. Boltuck and Litan (1991) contains several papers which 
discuss the large amount of uncertainty inherent in the dumping margin determination process. In 
addition, a conclusion which is fairly consistent throughout most of the papers in this volume is 
that there are strong biases in the process toward finding a positive dumping margin. The papers 
by Francois, by Palmeter, by Anspacher, and by Boltuck, Francois, and Kaplan in the Boltuck and 
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ments divided by the industry-specific shipments price index. All real magni- 
tudes are in 1972 dollars. We include IMPEN,,,-, and CAPU,,,-, in X,, because 
they are both predetermined as of the beginning of year r. We also include time 
fixed effects in X,,  to account for any trends in filing activity not accounted for 
by changes in observable or unobservable industry characteristics. 
We also include several additional variables to account for the fact that the 
magnitude of IMPEN and CAPU necessary to find harmful dumping may vary 
with the size and the structure of the domestic industry. We measure the size 
of an industry by EMP,,, aggregate employment for industry  i in period r, and 
expect that a given level of IMPEN and CAPU is more likely to be associated 
with a finding of injury the larger the size of the industry. We attempt to proxy 
for the (vertical) structure of an industry by value added per dollar of output 
in the industry, VADD,,/OUT,,, and expect that a given level of IMPEN and 
CAPU is more likely to be associated with a finding of injury to the domestic 
industry the lower is VADD/OUT, that is, the farther downstream the domestic 
industry is located and thus the smaller the share of primary factor payments 
in total industry cost and the more sensitive those factor payments will be to 
industry price changes. The final control variable we include is the percentage 
of all workers in the industry that are unionized, UNION. We hypothesize that 
this variable captures the ability of the industry to organize and file antidump- 
ing petitions against foreign competitors. Because these variables are predeter- 
mined at the beginning  of year  r,  lagged values of  VADD/OUT, EMP,  and 
UNION (their values for period r -  1 ) are included in X,,. 
As we have noted above, under the process filing strategy we would expect 
filing to be related to CAPU and little else and, in particular, not to be related 
to other measures important for the final determination of dumping (IMPEN, 
EMP,  and VADD/OUT). As with  outcome filing, we also hypothesize  that 
UNION captures the ability of  the industry to organize and file antidumping 
petitions against foreign competitors under the process filing strategy. 
Table 8.1 contains the sample means and standard errors for all of the vari- 
ables used in our analysis. The most striking aspect of the table is the large 
standard deviation of all filing and suit resolution process variables. In addi- 
tion, the sample skewness of  these variables is also very large and positive. 
These properties are indicative of the extreme rare event nature of antidumping 
suit activity and underscore the importance of specifying a statistical model 
which accounts for these characteristics of the economic environment. As men- 
tioned above, all dollar magnitudes are in real 1972 dollars. 
8.3.4  Results 
Tables 8.2-8.6 present estimates of the parameters of the filing rate equation 
for our five importing regions. We first will discuss these results and then turn 
to a discussion of our import and output equations. 
To interpret the results in tables 8.2-8.6, recall that under our assumptions Table 8.1  Means and Standard Errors of Variables: 2040 Year-Industry 
Observations  (i = 1,. .  .  ,  N = 338 industries and t = 1,.  .  .  ,  T  = 6 
years) 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Standard Error 
0GPLFV;;P" 
Total filings from Japan 
and NICs 
Total filings from 
Europe 
Total filings from 
planned economies 
Total filings from 
Canada or Mexico 
Total filings from other 
countries 
Total TSUS codes 
Real imports in lo6 
1972 dollars 
Real output in lo6 1972 
dollars 
Industry-level 
employment X  lo' 
Value added per dollar 
of real output 
Capacity utilization 
rate 
Import penetration ratio 




Japan and NICs 
Ongoing preliminary 
LTFV determination 
against Japan and NICs 
Ongoing suspension 
against Japan and NICs 
Ongoing withdrawal 
against Japan NICs 
Ongoing duties against 
Japan and NICs 
Ongoing antidumping 


























































































Canada or Mexico 
Ongoing preliminary 
LTFV determination 
against Canada or 
Mexico 
Ongoing suspension 
against Canada or 
Mexico 
Ongoing withdrawal 
against Canada or 
Mexico 
Ongoing duties against 
Canada or Mexico 
Ongoing antidumping 
petition against other 
Ongoing preliminary 







Ongoing duties against 
Mean  Standard Error 
0.065 
0.043 






























suspension agreements with Japan or the NICs were made during our sample time period Table 8.2  Filing Rate Equation Estimates for Japan and NICs (N = 338 
industries for T = 6 years) 





































Nore: NICs = Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and Hong Kong. 
Table 8.3  Filing Rate Equation Estimates for Western Europe (N = 338 
industries for T = 6 years) 




EM?  ,-I 
VADD, ,_,/OUT,  I_ I 
UNION, ,-I 













-  1.897 
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Table 8.4  Filing Rate Equation Estimates for Planned Economies of Eastern 
Europe (N = 338 industries for T = 6 years) 
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Table 8.5  Filing Rate Equation Estimates for Canada or Mexico (N = 338 
industries for T = 6 years) 
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Table 8.6  Filing Rate Equation Estimates for All Other Countries (N = 338 
industries for T = 6 years) 
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the mean of the filing rate against region r in industry i for period t is E(f,,)  = 
exp(X,:y,  + SrO,)ur.  Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of E( f,,,) yields 
ln~ECf,,)l  = X:,Y,  + 63,  + 1n(a,>. 
Consequently, each element of y,  can be interpreted as the percentage increase 
in the mean number of filings against region r as a result of a one-unit change 
in the associated element of X,,. This result allows us to make unitless compari- 
sons of elements of y,  across regions. 
Before discussing differences across the tables in parameter estimates we 
describe our test of whether these differences are statistically significant. We 
tested whether all of the elements of y,  (besides the constant term and time 
dummies) were equal across the five regions. This involves imposing 20 equal- 
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(IMPEN, CAPU, EMP, VADD/OUT, and UNION) to 25 coefficients (five vari- 
ables and five regions) in the unrestricted model. Under both the null and alter- 
native hypotheses we allow the ur and time dummies and constant tenris to 
differ across regions. The value of the likelihood ratio statistic for this test is 
124.19, which is significantly larger than the 0.01 critical value from a x& 
random variable of 37.57. Hence there is strong evidence of significant differ- 
ences in filing behavior across the five regions. 
The general conclusion to emerge from a comparison of results across these 
tables is that for filing behavior against the European region and the Japan/ 
NICs region, the outcome filing strategy seems the most plausible, while filing 
behavior against the CanadaMexico region yields results most consistent with 
the use of a process filing strategy. For filings against Europe and Japan and 
the NICs, the coefficient on IMPEN is precisely estimated and of the expected 
sign, something not shared by  the estimation results for any other regional 
grouping. In addition, the estimated coefficients on CAPU for the European 
region and on EMP for the JapadNICs region, additional variables which are 
important to the ITC’s final injury determination, are also estimated with preci- 
sion and of the expected sign. This is consistent with our outcome filer hypoth- 
esis. In contrast, for filings against the CanadaMexico region, only CAPU is 
a strong predictor of filing activity, both in terms of its relative magnitude and 
statistical precision. The other variables important for the ITC’s final injury 
determination lack predictive power for filing behavior against this region. 
This is consistent with our process filer view. For the planned economies and 
for our residual other region, it is difficult to argue if the data is at all informa- 
tive as to which of the two strategies is more likely. 
Perhaps the most strikingly uniform result across all of  the regions is the 
dramatic predictive power of UNION. For all importing regions, a higher per- 
centage of  unionized workers in an industry predicts a significantly higher 
number of filings against that region. This presumably reflects the general im- 
portance of overcoming the free-rider problem associated with bearing the cost 
of bringing an antidumping petition forward. 
Comparing the Japan/NICs results to the Europe results yields several con- 
clusions. First, CAPU appears to be both an economically and statistically 
more important predictor of filing activity against Europe than against Japan/ 
NICs. Second, the opposite conclusion holds for IMPEN when comparing the 
two regions. 
Tables 8.7 and 8.8 present our import and domestic output equation results 
which yield estimates of  the parameters of  the conditional mean  functions 
given in equation (16) which are used to assess the impact of the investigation 
process itself and of the outcome of the investigation on the flow of both im- 
ports and domestic output. 
We  make a number of observations. First, the investigation effects implied 
by  the coefficient estimates for  f3;wp  and f3&,,,  in table 8.7 and for f3&p 
and  f3&.PLFV  in table 8.8 are consistent with our findings regarding the filing 410  Robert W.  Staiger and Frank A. Wolak 
Table 8.7  Import Equation Estimates (N = 338 industries for T = 6 years) 
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strategies  across regions  noted  above. In  particular,  the filing of  a petition 
against firms in Europe or the Japan/NICs region leads to a rise in the rate of 
imports  up  until  an  affirmative preliminary  LTFV  determination,  at  which 
point the rate of imports falls precipitously and remains low until the conclu- 
sion of the investigation. These investigation effects are consistent  with the 
outcome filer hypothesis. In contrast, the filing of a petition against firms in 
the MexicoKanada region leads to an immediate fall in the rate of imports, 
which remains low until the conclusion of the investigation. These investiga- 
tion effects are consistent with the process filer hypothesis. As was true with 
the filing equation results,  the  investigation  effects implied  by the planned 411  Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law across Import Sources 
Table 8.8  Output Equation Estimates (N  = 338 industries for T  = 6 years) 






























































































economy and the residual other regions are inconclusive with regard to the 
implied filing strategy. The results from the output equation estimation rein- 
force these conclusions, although the parameters are estimated less precisely. 
As for the differing effects of investigation outcomes on postinvestigation 
imports and domestic output, our parameter estimates imply that the imposi- 
tion of antidumping duties against any region strongly reduces imports of the 
products involved, while the response of  domestic import-competing  output 
is positive but less precisely estimated. Petitions against a region which are 
subsequently withdrawn appear to have no lasting effects on imports or domes- 
tic output, confirming our earlier findings (Staiger and Wolak 1994a). Finally, 412  Robert W.  Staiger and Frank A. Wolak 
the paucity of suspension agreements in our sample makes it difficult to assess 
regional differences (the Japan/NICs region, e.g., did not negotiate any suspen- 
sion agreements with the United States during our sample period), but to the 
extent that the estimates  are informative  they  suggest that only  suspension 
agreements with Europe are successful in restricting  imports of the products 
involved.  This,  of  course,  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  suspension 
agreements with other regions do not reduce bilateral imports from those re- 
gions, but only that such agreements are not effective in reducing the overall 
imports of the relevant product into the U.S. market. 
8.4  Conclusion 
Our cross-country analysis of the determinants and impacts of antidumping 
suits has revealed a substantial amount of heterogeneity between the different 
trading regions. At the most basic level these results show that although there 
is a large stochastic component, antidumping suit filings are predictable events 
using observable industry magnitudes. Against Western Europe and Japan and 
the NICs, the use of antidumping law appears to be consistent with the view 
that firms file in expectation of obtaining relief via antidumping duties or sus- 
pension agreements-outcome  filers in our nomenclature. This is suggested 
by the pattern of filing against these regions, which appears to reflect a concern 
for meeting the injury requirements necessary to secure a finding of dumping, 
as well as by the import and domestic output responses to filing and the various 
phases of the suit resolution process. But we have also argued that a distinctive 
filing  strategy  against  Canada  and  Mexico  would  be  expected  on a priori 
grounds and, in particular, that Canada and Mexico are the most likely targets 
of  process filing by U.S.  firms over our sample period because their export 
production  is predominantly destined for the U.S. market and accounts for a 
relatively high and stable U.S.  market share. In line with these a priori views, 
we find evidence in the use of antidumping law against Mexico and Canada 
that is consistent with our process filer logic, where firms file primarily to ob- 
tain the protection afforded during the investigation process itself. This is sup- 
ported by  the pattern  of filing against these countries, which appears to be 
driven primarily by the level of capacity utilization but unrelated to other ob- 
servable measures of injury, as well as by the import and domestic output re- 
sponses to filing and the various phases of the suit resolution process. 
Finally, we can use our coefficient estimates in table 8.7 to provide a rough 
idea of the magnitudes of all the trade-distorting effects, by region and by type 
of effect, that are associated with the use of antidumping law during our sample 
period. We compute the total sample distortions to U.S.  imports from the inves- 
tigation process associated with petitions against region r as follows: 413  Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law  across Import Sources 
The total sample distortions to U.S. imports from the postinvestigation effects 
due to petitions against region r are computed as follows: 
We  exclude the effects of withdrawn petitions because the coefficients associ- 
ated with OGWD,, in the import equation are never statistically different from 
zero. We  then compute IMFTOT, defined as the sum of  multilateral imports 
over all industries and years in our sample, and express DKvr  and DgNDr  as a 
percentage of IMFTOT. 
For our sample of industries and for the six years of available data, the total 
amount of U.S. import reductions from all investigation effects against West- 
em Europe amounts to approximately -0.05  percent of total U.S. imports over 
the sample period, while the total distortion attributable to postinvestigation 
effects against Western Europe is -  1.14 percent of total imports over the sam- 
ple period. For Japan and the NICs, the distortions to U.S. imports from inves- 
tigation and postinvestigation effects from petitions against this region amount 
to 0.87 and -2.31  percent, respectively, of total U.S. imports.’O For both these 
regions, the major import distortions associated with the use of  antidumping 
law are attributable to postinvestigation effects. For Mexico and Canada, on 
the other hand, the relative importance of  investigation and postinvestigation 
effects is reversed: the distortions to U.S. imports associated with investigation 
and  postinvestigation  effects  of  petitions  against Mexico and  Canada are 
-0.84  and -0.25  percent, respectively, of total U.S.  imports. This conforms 
to our findings that U.S. firms appear to be outcome filers against Europe and 
Japan and the NICs, and hence the main import restrictions come with the 
explicit remedies provided by the law (duties or suspension agreements), while 
U.S. firms appear to be process filers against Mexico and Canada, and hence 
the main import restrictions come from the investigation effects. 
A final implication of our process filer/outcome filer distinction is that the 
frequency with which outcome filers ought to secure duties should be substan- 
tially higher than for process filers. To investigate this hypothesis we computed 
the sum of OGD,,  in Mexico and Canada for all industries and all six years in 
our sample, and then divided this sum by  the sum ofx,, for all industries and 
all six years for the same region. This ratio gives the per-suit level of  duty 
activity against Mexico and Canada, the region against which U.S. firms ap- 
pear to be process filers. We  then repeated this calculation for Europe and 
Japan and the NICs, treating this as the aggregate region against which U.S. 
firms appear to be outcome filers. Dividing the “outcome filer ratio” by  the 
10. The positive boost to U.S.  imports associated with investigation effects of petitions against 
Japan and the NICs reflects the fact that the effect of filing on imports is positive and relatively 
large and the effect of an  affirmative preliminary LTFV determination, while negative, does not 
persist long enough to reverse this cumulative positive effect. 414  Robert W.  Staiger and Frank A. Wolak 
“process filer ratio” yields 3.73, suggesting that in our sample, a product-level 
antidumping petition is 3.73 times more likely to end in duties when it is filed 
against firms in Europe, Japan, or a NIC versus firms from Canada or Mexico. 
This result is consistent with the view that suits against Canada and Mexico 
are  filed less for  the  eventual protection  provided  by  duties  than  are  suits 
against Europe and Japan and the NICs. 
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Comment  Kala Krishna 
This is a really nice paper, both for the interesting econometric methodology 
used, as well as for the questions asked. In previous work, Staiger and Wolak 
empirically examined the determinants of  suit filing and the trade impacts of 
U.S. antidumping law. Here, they build on that work to try and see whether 
there are differences in “the uses and effects of U.S. antidumping law on im- 
ports and domestic output across the major regions exporting to the United 
States.” The overall topic is of considerable importance for policy as previous 
work has shown that filing itself, as well as settlement, and not just winning 
the case, has effects on prices and imports in the market. This suggests that 
antidumping petitions may actually be used to support tacit collusion as argued 
by Prusa (1991, 1992). 
My comments are divided into three parts. In the first part, I argue that there 
seems to be a problem  in one of the key features of  this paper,  namely, an 
attempt to distinguish between what the authors call “outcome” and “process” 
filers. In the second, I make some suggestions for extensions which may or 
may not be feasible. And in the third, I make some suggestions for organization 
and presentation. I shall say little about the econometrics: it is always easy to 
point out that the specification rules out interactive effects of a particular kind, 
and I leave these criticisms to the reader. Rather, I shall try and focus on what 
might be conceptual or organizational issues and possible extensions. 
Kala Krishna is professor of economics at Pennsylvania State University and a research associ- 
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One of the key features of this paper, in contrast to its precursors, is that it 
attempts to show that suits are filed for different reasons on different groups 
of importers. The five groups are (1) Canada and Mexico, (2) Europe, (3) Japan 
and the NICs, (4) planned economies, and (5) other countries. At the heart of 
their analysis is a distinction between what they call “outcome filers” (firms 
for which the prospect of  an antidumping duty is an important ingredient in 
the decision to file) and “process filers” (firms for which filing is driven largely 
by  a desire to secure the trade restricting effects of  the investigation process 
itself). There is, however, a bit of a problem with this aspect of the paper. 
First, trying to infer the motivation of  filers-what  is going on  in  their 
heads-from  the outcome is always difficult. The reasons for filing could eas- 
ily be the same, but the outcome different, if  the countries themselves differ. 
U.S. law provides for an assessment of “critical circumstances” under which 
duties can be retroactively imposed to the date of filing if  filing brings with it 
a surge of imports. Given this, it could be that one country or group of coun- 
tries behaves differently because its importers are risk averse and cannot afford 
to take the chance of retroactive duties, and not because of a difference in the 
kinds of suits filed. However, in all fairness I should also point out that there are 
other pieces of the puzzle which the authors also consider in their arguments. 
Second, there are likely to be mixed motives in any filing, and a priori, I for 
one would not expect to be able to separate them based on the kind of data that 
is likely to be available. Case studies and interviews might help here, but I can 
see very little else that might. 
Third, it is commonly understood that antidumping suits filed in steel were 
of a very different form than those elsewhere. The attempt to flood the system 
with petitions by  this industry commonly hypothesized might suggest taking 
steel cases out of the data and looking at them separately. 
Fourth, if Europe and Japan attract outcome filers as suggested, then these 
suits should be stronger intrinsically than those against the other countries. Is 
this reflected in the settlement and determination data? A by-product should 
also be  that  for stronger suits, as the probability of  antidumping duties is 
higher, imports should fall more after a preliminary positive finding than for 
weaker  suits.  However,  in  the  import  equations,  the  coefficient  on  the 
OGPLFV variable is negative in all but the planned economies case, though it 
is not significant for the other country group. 
Moving on  to the second part of  my  comments, possible suggestions for 
extensions, a different cut at the data might be to look at what happens in the 
cases where there is a negative preliminary finding. Are there any such cases? 
Do the different groups of countries look different? 
Another question that might be worth pursuing is whether there has been a 
change in recent years in the way that antidumping suits have been used. There 
is a perception that in recent years such suits have been increasingly used to 
implicitly restrict imports and that nuisance suits are on the increase. Is there 
any evidence of such a change in regime? 417  Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law  across Import Sources 
Finally, some simple presentation changes could help improve the readabil- 
ity of  the paper. First, it is always nice to see some rough data cuts which, 
without any sophisticated econometrics, might help motivate the main thrust 
of the paper: that suits against Europe and Japan look different than those on 
other countries. Are the settlement rates higher? Are the positive finding rates 
higher? Are the dumping margins evaluated higher? 
Second, the regressions could be better presented. To make it easier to com- 
pare against countries, the results on the same variable across countries could 
be put on one row, with the level of significance given for ease of comparison. 
Third, the model itself should be relegated to an appendix and a quick sum- 
mary left in the text. It is hard to plough through it to get to the results. 
To conclude, the paper has many things to recommend it. The questions it 
asks are important and thought provoking, as well as cleanly analyzed. I look 
forward to seeing more on this important issue in the future. 
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Comment  Anne E. Brunsdale and Keith B. Anderson 
The most interesting contribution of  this paper and of  an earlier one by  the 
same authors (Staiger and Wolak 1994) is their estimates of the effects anti- 
dumping investigations and orders have on the quantity of imports. The authors 
examine not only the effect of antidumping orders-the  end result of a “suc- 
cessful” petition-but  also how imports are affected at various stages in the 
investigational process. They find that imports are significantly reduced once 
the Department of Commerce finds that the price of the subject imports is too 
low. (In the jargon of antidumping law, the subject imports are found to be sold 
at less than fair value (LTFV).) In some cases the decline in imports comes 
even sooner-as  soon as the investigational process is triggered by  the filing 
of a petition. Completion of the investigation and the entry of a final antidump- 
ing order generally leads to no additional decline in imports.’ 
Anne E. Brunsdale is a former chairman of the U.S. International Trade Commission, where 
Keith B. Anderson served as her senior economic advisor. 
1. The authors also look  at the effect of the suspension of an investigation as the result of an 
agreement being reached with the foreign producers and the effect of the withdrawal of a petition 
prior to final action. The authors also examine the effects of antidumping orders and investigations 418  Robert W.  Staiger and Frank A. Wolak 
These results should not be surprising to those who are familiar with the 
arcane and convoluted  process involved  in establishing antidumping duties. 
However, it is useful to have empirical evidence to support our intuition. Under 
the statutory scheme, once the Commerce Department finds that imports are 
being sold at an unfairly low price, importers must begin posting bonds equal 
to the estimated dumping margin. (The importer’s ultimate liability  is deter- 
mined by an ex posr comparison of the price actually paid and what the Com- 
merce Department determines to be the fair value of those imports.)* Provided 
the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC or ITC) finds material injury, 
nothing really changes when the final order goes into place. Bonds covering 
estimated dumping margins are still required, and the importer’s ultimate lia- 
bility remains indeterminate until an ex post review is conducted.’ Therefore, 
it is not surprising that the effects prior to the final order are similar to those af- 
ter~ard.~ 
While these findings are useful and consistent with our expectations, we are 
concerned that Staiger and Wolak seem to have assumed that every dumping 
investigation has the same effect on the dollar value of imports and domestic 
production.s The effect of a dumping case is assumed to be independent of the 
size of the industry, the unfair imports’ share of the total sales in the industry, 
and the degree to which the prices charged are below fair levels-the  size of 
the dumping margin. Simple economic theory suggests that these assumptions 
cannot be correct. Effects should be greater in larger industries and in indus- 
tries where the unfair imports account for a larger percentage of  total sales. 
Similarly, the effect should be greater where the difference between the actual 
price of the imports and their “fair” level is relatively high.b 
on domestic production. In general, the estimates of these effects are much  less robust than the 
effect on imports. 
2. In general, fair value is the price charged in the country where the imported product is pro- 
duced, the price in some third country, or the total cost of producing the product, including statuto- 
rily mandated minimum levels for profits and overhead expenses. (For a general discussion of the 
details of U.S. antidumping practice, see Horlick [  19891.) 
3. In fact, reviews are not always conducted. If  no interested party requests a review covering 
imports during a period of time, the importer’s final liability  is simply set equal to the estimated 
dumping duty. 
There is one minor difference between the importer’s ultimate liability  before a final dumping 
order is entered and its liability  after the order is entered. Prior to the publication  of  the  final 
dumping order, the importer’s maximum liability is the level of the bond paid. After the order is in 
place, this is no longer truc. If the Commerce Department ultimately  determines that the margin 
of dumping is greater than the bond  that has been posted, the importer is required to make up 
the difference. During either period, if  the ultimate margin  is less than the bond, the difference 
is refunded. 
4. Similarly, an investigation  can only be stopped by  means of a suspension agrccment if  the 
foreign producers agree to raise  their  prices to completely eliminate their unfairly  low  prices. 
Thus, it is not surprising that Staiger and Wolak find that a suspension agreement has the same 
effect as a final order. 
5.  Technically, the assumption is that the effect per tariff classification covered by the investiga- 
tion is a constant. 
6.  In addition, the effect will  depend on the degree to which  the imports and the domestic 
product  are substitutes, the elasticity of  demand for the product, and the elasticity of  domestic 
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That the effects of antidumping cases on imports and domestic shipments 
differ substantially from case to case can be seen by looking at the eight cases 
examined by Anderson (1993b) in a study of the welfare effects of antidump- 
ing actions. In these cases, we estimate that the antidumping process on aver- 
age caused imports to decline by approximately $3  1 million per year and do- 
mestic production to increase by about $28 million per year.’  However, there 
were very large differences from case to case. In chrome-plated lug nuts from 
the People’s Republic of  China, the antidumping investigation and order de- 
creased imports by  only an estimated $200,000 per  year and increased the 
value of  domestic shipments by  only about $100,000. At the other extreme, 
the antidumping investigation and order involving portland cement and cement 
clinker from Mexico decreased  imports by approximately $145 million  and 
increased the value of domestic shipments by approximately $165 million.8 
In addition to estimating the effects of dumping investigations, Staiger and 
Wolak seek to test two alternative models of  why antidumping petitions are 
filed. In the first model, the petitioner-an  “outcome filer”-is  hypothesized 
to be truly interested in the long-term reduction in imports that will result from 
a final antidumping order. The second model hypothesizes that some petition- 
ers-“process  filers”-merely  want to obtain the temporary benefits that will 
arise while the investigation is underway. These petitioners supposedly do not 
care much whether they get an affirmative final injury determination, just that 
they  get an affirmative  preliminary  injury  determination  and an affirmative 
LTFV  determination so that duties will be collected for a few months. They 
only care about temporary benefits because they and foreign producers have, 
at least tacitly, a market-sharing agreement which is threatened by a temporary 
downturn  in demand and resulting excess capacity. The filing of  a dumping 
petition will, the authors hypothesize, persuade the foreign producers to keep 
to the agreement and not engage in active price competition. 
While the notion that firms may use the antidumping process to limit compe- 
tition has a certain appeal and is not new,’  Staiger and Wolak’s model suffers 
from a misunderstanding of  exactly how the administrative process works at 
the ITC. One area of misunderstanding is the authors’ belief that the commis- 
sion’s preliminary determinations are based on the information contained in the 
petition  and that the commission does not have information on a number of 
factors, such as employment and import penetration, that will be considered in 
7. These estimates are based on standard partial equilibrium analysis using the elasticities and 
other parameter values discussed in Anderson (1993b). The domestic production change figures 
are based on the midpoints of  the estimated ranges of values for the individual cases reported 
there. The level  of  imports after the antidumping process has had its effect, and therefore the 
change in imports resulting from the process, is estimated from the reported tariff revenue effects 
and knowledge of the size of the antidumping duty and of any existing regular duty. 
8. We  note that these estimates are for the entire case, while Staiger and Wolak examine the 
effects per included tariff classification. This however does not alter our point. Since there were 
three harmonized tariff categories affected by  cement and one in the case of chrome-plated lug 
nuts, the effects per import category are several hundred times greater in the case of cement than 
in lug nuts. 
9. The same argument has been made in Messerlin (1990). 420  Robert W.  Staiger and Frank A. Wolak 
a final investigation. This is not correct, Prior to a preliminary determination, 
the ITC staff conducts its own investigation of  the subject imports and the 
condition of the domestic industry. In addition, the staff holds a public hearing 
where both petitioners and respondents have an opportunity to make arguments 
and provide information, and both parties have the opportunity to submit briefs 
arguing their case. While the information available at the time of a preliminary 
determination is not as complete as is available at the time of a final determina- 
tion, the same types of data are available and are the result of an independent 
investigation by ITC staff, not a simple reliance on the information contained 
in the petition. 
A second misunderstanding relates to the use of  data on industry perfor- 
mance during the period between the filing of a petition and the time of the 
final ITC injury determination. Staiger and Wolak hypothesize that foreign 
producers will not compete aggressively during the pendency of an antidump- 
ing investigation since a less aggressive stance during this period should reduce 
the likelihood that the domestic industry will be found to be materially injured. 
While the logic of this argument is impeccable, it has not gone unnoticed by 
ITC commissioners. As a result, the commission is very reluctant to place 
much weight on evidence relating to the period after a petition is filed. Indeed, 
the reluctance is sometimes carried too far. In a 1991 case involving fresh At- 
lantic salmon from Norway, the majority of the commission found injury even 
though salmon imports from Norway had declined precipitously since the fil- 
ing of  the petition as a result of  changes in exchange rates, not as a result of 
any action taken by  the Norwegian producers.10 
If the process-filer theory has shortcomings, how does one explain the dif- 
ference in results found between cases involving Western European and major 
Asian countries and those involving other countries? Why does the level of 
imports increase when a petition is filed against imports from Western Europe 
or Japan and the Asian NICs but decline when a petition is filed against imports 
from  other  countries?  Staiger and  Wolak  see  this  as  evidence that  their 
outcome-filer model explains cases filed against Europe and Japan and the 
NICs,  while the process-filer model explains cases against the developing 
countries. However, it seems to us that the result may have more to do with the 
ability to control the timing of  shipments than with the strategy behind the 
filing. If  an imported good is coming from one of the major developed coun- 
tries, controlling when the shipment is received is likely to be easier than when 
the good is being produced in a country with less-developed manufacturing, 
communications, and transportation systems. (While this may  be becoming 
less true today, recall that the authors’ data covers the period from  1980 to 
1985.) As a result, importers may  be hesitant to place orders for shipmenis 
10.  Cf. the dissenting views of Acting Chairman Anne E. Brunsdale (USITC 1991, 33-35)  with 
the views of the commission (USITC 1991, 17). (“We have given less weight to the recent decline 
in imports in 1990 because it appears to be largely the result of the filing of  the petition andor  the 
imposition of provisional antidumping and countervailing duties.”) 421  Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law across Import Sources 
from such countries after a petition is filed for fear that the order will not arrive 
until after the preliminary decision and that they will therefore be  liable for 
dumping duties of an unknown magnitude." 
In conclusion, in spite of some methodological concerns, the most interest- 
ing finding of the two papers by Staiger and Wolak is the empirical confirma- 
tion that the effect of an antidumping order occurs no later than the Commerce 
Department's preliminary LTFV  determination. There is no additional effect 
from the entry of an antidumping order at the end of the investigational pro- 
cess. There appear to be more significant problems with the authors'  attempt 
to model and test the reasons firms choose to seek antidumping orders. 
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